Many believe, mostly by inference and Cohencidence, that one reason the Deep State has so few defectors is that they preferentially hire child molesters, sadists and psychopaths, so that they can be easily accused & destroyed if they step out of line. One can only speculate how many talented project managers and analysts have been passed over by Fedgov because they were honest and honorable.
That’s what this sounded like at first: the CIA cashing out its insurance policy against an agent gone rogue. But as details emerged, no, the CIA is burning its own reputation in a desperate effort to frame a patsy!
Former CIA agent facing trial for the agency’s largest leak drew swastikas on students’ books at high school, report says
h ttps://www.yahoo.com/news/former-cia-agent-facing-trial-143555409.html
By Sam Tabahriti for Business Insider, 12 June 2022
The former CIA agent [Joshua Schulte] accused of the largest leak in the agency’s history drew swastikas and showed his genitals to other students at high school, according to a profile published by The New Yorker.
Joshua Schulte became so known for his temper at the CIA that he was nicknamed the Nuclear Option, Patrick Radden Keefe wrote.
One of his school friends, Kavi Patel, said the former CIA agent used to “draw swastikas all over the place,” but claimed he was not anti-Semitic.
Did none of that come out in his background check? A top-secret-compartmented-whatever-level background check on a CIA recruit didn’t notice that the new hire was a known anti-Semite and sociopathic exhibitionist?
Or is that why he got the job in the first place?
There’s no way to read this that doesn’t make the CIA look like a hive of rayciss incompetents.
When Schulte was in college, he argued on his blog that pornography is a form of free expression that “is not degrading to women” and “does not incite violence,” Keefe wrote for The New Yorker.
Wait. Those are not crimes. Even many feminists argue that porn is liberating and it’s certainly not violent, unless you count flogging the bishop.
One woman interviewed for the article said Schulte had repeatedly exposed his genitals to other students in the junior high school band. “He would try and touch people, or get people to touch him—that was a daily occurrence,” she said.
How did he even make it out of junior high without a sex offender registry? No way would that get missed during a security clearance screening. Either the CIA retconned the man’s entire life in order to discredit him today… or this was how the agency talent-scouted him in the first place. Could still go either way.
The investigators discovered a large amount of child pornography, and his internet research history showed his interest in WikiLeaks.
They lost me at kiddie porn. Which is it, sexual over-aggression or hidden fetish? A single personality is unlikely to do both. Furthermore, he reportedly liked women. Homo is a major indicator of pedo and that’s missing here.
But it’s really easy to upload a directory of jpegs, then get a warrant and “discover” them. Like accusing a clean-cut guy who is regularly drug-tested by his job, of being a junkie because a search found a dime bag in the laundry basket.
The wikileaks angle, well, that’s the crime he’s actually being accused of.
In March 2017, WikiLeaks published a series of articles disclosing confidential information from the CIA taken from 2 billion pages of documents stolen from the agency.
In his article, Keele quotes a WikiLeaks statement suggesting that the person who leaked the information wanted “to initiate a public debate” about the use of cyberweapons. Investigators suspected Schulte, obtained a warrant and searched his flat.
Hmm, that’s not what either an antiSemitic rapist or a kiddie-diddie would do. That’s what a troubled conscience would do. These accusations are BOGUS!
Let’s go to that New Yorker hatchet job. There’s clearly more to be learned.
The Surreal Case of a C.I.A. Hacker’s Revenge
A hot-headed coder is accused of exposing the agency’s hacking arsenal. Did he betray his country because he was pissed off at his colleagues?
h ttps://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2022/06/13/the-surreal-case-of-a-cia-hackers-revenge
By Patrick Radden Keefe, 6 June 2022
Nestled west of Washington, D.C., amid the bland northern Virginia suburbs, are generic-looking office parks that hide secret government installations in plain sight… To the casual observer, they resemble anonymous corporate drones. In fact, they hold Top Secret clearances and work in defense and intelligence. One of these buildings, at an address that is itself a secret, houses the cyberintelligence division of the Central Intelligence Agency. The facility is surrounded by a high fence and monitored by guards armed with military-grade weapons.
Hidden in plain sight, he says. Hmm. I knew a few ‘hoods in Los Angeles where this would have looked normal enough, surely D.C. does too, but this was a suburban office park?
When employees enter the building, they must badge in and pass through a full-body turnstile. Inside, on the ninth floor, through another door that requires badge access, is a C.I.A. office with an ostentatiously bland name: the Operations Support Branch. It is the agency’s secret hacker unit, in which a cadre of élite engineers create cyberweapons.
“O.S.B. was focussed on what we referred to as ‘physical-access operations,’ ” a senior developer from the unit, Jeremy Weber—a pseudonym—explained. This is not dragnet mass surveillance of the kind more often associated with the National Security Agency. These are hacks, or “exploits,” designed for individual targets. Sometimes a foreign terrorist or a finance minister is too sophisticated to be hacked remotely, and so the agency is obliged to seek “physical access” to that person’s devices. Such operations are incredibly dangerous: a C.I.A. officer or an asset recruited to work secretly for the agency—a courier for the terrorist; the finance minister’s personal chef—must surreptitiously implant the malware by hand. “It could be somebody who was willing to type on a keyboard for us,” Weber said. “It often was somebody who was willing to plug a thumb drive into the machine.” In this manner, human spies, armed with the secret digital payloads designed by the Operations Support Branch, have been able to compromise smartphones, laptops, tablets, and even TVs: when Samsung developed a set that responded to voice commands, the wizards at the O.S.B. exploited a software vulnerability that turned it into a listening device.
The modern equivalent of a keyboard pass-through is hardly an elite achievement.
The members of the O.S.B. “built quick-reaction tools,” Anthony Leonis, the chief of another cyberintelligence unit of the C.I.A., said. “That branch was really good at taking ideas and prototypes and turning them into tools that could be used in the mission, very quickly.” According to the man who supervised the O.S.B., Sean, the unit could be “a high-stress environment,” because it was supporting life-or-death operations.
Without having seen a bio, puff pieces like this confirm for me that Keefe is allied-CIA. “My job is extremely stressful because long after it’s done, some whore will upload it into a billionaire’s Nokia,” no.
“My job is extremely stressful because the heavily armed guards glare at me when I thrust my exposed genitals at them” would be plausible but maybe Schulte outgrew that after junior high? Such never gets mentioned.
But, while these jobs were cutting edge and—at least vicariously—dangerous, the O.S.B. was, in other respects, just like any office. …There was banter, plenty of it, much of it jocular, some of it juvenile. The coders were mostly young men, and they came up with nicknames for one another. One unit member, who got braces as an adult, became known as Train Tracks. When another brought food into the office one day, but didn’t share it with some members of the team, his colleagues bestowed a new handle: Dick Move. The group’s ultimate manager was a more senior C.I.A. official, named Karen, who acknowledged that the members could get “boisterous,” adding, “Folks could get a little loud, a little bit back and forth.” Some O.S.B. guys brought Nerf guns to work—not mere pistols but big, colorful machine guns—and they would occasionally shoot darts at one another from their desks. Sometimes people got carried away, and work was paused for some sustained bombardment. But Silicon Valley was known for tricking out offices with foosball tables and climbing walls, and it’s likely that the C.I.A. wanted to foster a loose culture on the hacking team, to help engineers remain innovative and, when necessary, blow off steam.
One of the Nerf gunfighters was Joshua Schulte—his real name. A skinny Texan in his twenties, he had a goatee and a shaved head. In what may have been a preëmptive gambit, Schulte gave himself the nickname Bad Ass, going so far as to make a fake nameplate and stick it on his cubicle. But others in the office called him Voldemort—a reference to the hairless villain in the Harry Potter books. Schulte and his colleagues worked on sophisticated malware with such code names as AngerQuake and Brutal Kangaroo. The hackers christened their exploits with names that reflected personal enthusiasms. Several programs were named for brands of whiskey: there was Wild Turkey, and Ardbeg, and Laphroaig. One was called McNugget. Though there was something dissonantly adolescent about naming highly classified digital hacking tools in such a fashion, it seemed harmless enough: if the tools worked as planned, none of the code would ever be detected. And, if the target of an operation did discover that some nasty bit of malware had infiltrated her device, a silly name would offer no clue that it had been created by the United States government. Deniability was central to what the O.S.B. did.
And so it went. To use the sociosexual hierarchy, which is useful here, this was a grouping of Gammas and Deltas. What you’d expect for an office focused on mentally demanding, no-muscle work.
On March 7, 2017, the Web site WikiLeaks launched a series of disclosures that were catastrophic for the C.I.A. As much as thirty-four terabytes of data—more than two billion pages’ worth—had been stolen from the agency. The trove, billed as Vault 7, represented the single largest leak of classified information in the agency’s history. Along with a subsequent installment known as Vault 8, it exposed the C.I.A.’s hacking methods, including the tools that had been developed in secret by the O.S.B., complete with some of the source code. “This extraordinary collection . . . gives its possessor the entire hacking capacity of the C.I.A.,” WikiLeaks announced. The leak dumped out the C.I.A.’s toolbox: the custom-made techniques that it had used to compromise Wi-Fi networks, Skype, antivirus software. It exposed Brutal Kangaroo and AngerQuake. It even exposed McNugget.
In the days after this colossal breach became public, the C.I.A. declined to comment on the “authenticity or content of purported intelligence documents.” Internally, however, there was a grim realization that the agency’s secrets had been laid bare.
Not really. Somebody published the malware to make Alexa send a copy of what she hears to a certain IP address? The worst part of that would be other intel agencies using the program.
But who could have stolen the data? In a statement, WikiLeaks suggested that the person who shared the intelligence wished “to initiate a public debate” about the use of cyberweapons. But WikiLeaks had also shown, quite recently, a willingness to be a mouthpiece for foreign intelligence services: in 2016, the site had released e-mails from the Democratic National Committee which had been stolen by hackers working on behalf of the Kremlin.
Psst, the secret password was “password”. Nobody could have figured it out unless they were working for the KGB! Hillary Clinton was prescient when she wanted to nuke Russia into glass! See how hard they’re trying to stop her!
Vault 7, some observers speculated, might also be the work of a hostile government. James Lewis, of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, told the Times, “A foreign power is much more likely the source of these documents than a conscience-stricken C.I.A. whistle-blower.” Perhaps Russia was again the culprit. Or might it be Iran?
Agreed that a government/corporate actor makes the best sense. While it was a massive data dump, the upshot of it was that device manufacturers learned how to secure their tech against CIA intrusion. Cui Bono? Sony Corp.
By contrast, Snowden revealed that Deep State was directly targeting American citizens in total violation of all restrictions on government power. Cui Bono? the American people.
As the intelligence community mobilized to identify the source of the leak, the federal government found itself in an awkward position—because Donald Trump, shortly before being elected President, had celebrated the hacking of Democratic officials, declaring, “I love WikiLeaks.” Nevertheless, this new breach was perceived as such an egregious affront to U.S. national security that the Administration was determined to get to the bottom of it.
Trump Derangement Syndrome for the motive! If Orange Man likes Wikileaks then somebody must hang for this databreach!
The F.B.I. began an investigation, and agents worked around the clock…
The Bureau was pursuing what it calls an “unsub”—or “unknown subject”—investigation. “A crime had been committed; we didn’t yet know who had committed it,” one of the lead investigators, Richard Evanchec, later testified.
HAH! The FBI investigates its own informants and false flags so often, they need a special term for investigations that begin without a known perp.
Fairly quickly, the agents ruled out a foreign power as the culprit, deciding that the unsub must be a C.I.A. insider.
And a Drumpf Lover! Or at least an anti-Semite. Hard to find a Drumpf Lover in the CIA.
As the F.B.I. interviewed members of the team, a suspect came into focus: Joshua Schulte. Voldemort.
What a convenient nickname.
He had left the agency in November, 2016, and was said to have been disgruntled.
Four months before the leak? That’s a very unlikely suspect. Even if Schulte was, as reported here, one of the sysadmins.
He now lived in Manhattan…
Not a Trump voter, then. Maybe they couldn’t find any in the CIA at all. Smarter institutions hire token conservatives for exactly this purpose.
…where he worked as a software engineer at Bloomberg. As Schulte was leaving the office one evening, Evanchec and another F.B.I. agent intercepted him. When they explained that they were investigating the leak, he agreed to talk. They went to a nearby restaurant, Pershing Square, opposite Grand Central Terminal. Schulte may not have realized it, but the other patrons seated around them were actually plainclothes F.B.I. agents, who were there to monitor the situation—and to intervene if he made any sudden moves. Schulte was amiable and chatty. But, when Evanchec looked down, he noticed that Schulte’s hands were shaking.
That’s not normal police interview procedure. At all. That’s a blindsiding and fishing expedition.
Schulte was born in 1988 and grew up in Lubbock, Texas. He was the oldest of four boys; his father, Roger, is a financial adviser; his mother, Deanna, is a high-school guidance counsellor. Schulte was a bright child, and in elementary school he was fascinated when one of his teachers took apart a computer in front of the class. By the time he was in high school, his parents told me, he was building computers himself. “Some people are born with certain talents,” Deanna said. While Schulte was studying engineering at the University of Texas at Austin, he did an internship at I.B.M., and another at the N.S.A. On a blog that he maintained in college, he espoused libertarian views. He was a devotee of Ayn Rand, and came to believe that, as he put it, “there is nothing evil about rational selfishness.” He also had a certain intellectual arrogance. “Most Americans, most people in general, are idiots,” he wrote in 2008.
Ayn Rand founded objectivism, not libertarianism. And MPAI is not arrogance. It is an exhausted, world-weary observation of the blindingly obvious.
“I don’t want a ‘Big Brother’ constantly looking over my shoulder,” Schulte once wrote, and his libertarianism might have seemed difficult to square with a career in intelligence.
No shit, Sherlock. Which is it?
…According to Schulte’s parents, his dream was to work for the government. “He never talked about the private sector at all,” Deanna told me, explaining that he was motivated by patriotism. “I think he was very proud to serve his country.”
Not libertarian, then. Look, I know this type. I was one myself until… life happened. We’re too nerdy to have strong political beliefs. Religion, maybe, it can keep us grounded, but the nerd mind is like Disneyland on a rocket ship that can go anywhere and do anything, and it’s way more fun than SCREW… the So-Called REal World. Our awareness of the outside world is mostly the bare minimum of food, friends and f*cks to keep our bodily urges from interfering with our explorations of the mind.
Schulte didn’t have any strong political beliefs going into the CIA, if this article is even half-correct. He simply relied on external social conventions while dabbling with the usual mental-political fads along the way. Unfortunately and predictably, that made him a Gamma. The Nerf gunfighting mentioned in this article, is Delta behavior. Guys who can give & take a little and socialize well enough. A Gamma put in that situation, will eventually take that kind of play personally, and that is basically what happened… coinciding with a promotion to administrator. Grudge + authority = bad office karma.
Things escalated between him and coworkers until Schulte began crossing lines:
Up to this point, though Schulte could be vexing and obstreperous, he was working within the broad bureaucratic parameters of the agency. Others might have found his vendetta against [coworker] Amol irrational, but he had confined it to traditional channels, pushing his appeal up the chain of command. Now he embarked on a more decisive escalation, concluding, as he later explained, that “since the Agency wouldn’t help me, perhaps the state would.” Citing fears for his safety, Schulte filed for a restraining order against Amol in Virginia state court.
This was a startling departure from normal conduct for the C.I.A…. The notion of allowing an internal squabble to spill into the unclassified realm was anathema.
If the CIA needed to find a fall guy for the Vault 7 Wikileak, nobody was about to cry for Schulte.
Before Schulte’s departure, there had been one final fracas… Without asking for authorization, [he] reassigned himself access to his old project. When his managers learned of this, they were so alarmed that they stripped Schulte of his administrator privileges.
That seems final. It would be out of character for Schulte to have downloaded the Vault 7 data in preparation for his self-inflicted loss of admin privileges. And of course, any cleanup team worthy of continued employment would have checked what Schulte did during his last few days of access.
This ain’t the kind of guy to nobly alert the world of CIA shenanigans. Unless he thought filing a restraining order on a coworker would establish credibility.
Soon after the F.B.I. began its investigation, agents placed Schulte under surveillance, and they learned that he was about to leave for Mexico. Edward Snowden had fled to Hong Kong and then to Russia, where he remains, beyond the reach of U.S. authorities. Faced with the possibility that Schulte might abscond in similar fashion, investigators made their move, with Agent Evanchec stopping him as he left work at Bloomberg and taking him to Pershing Square. It had emerged that when Schulte left the C.I.A. he had not returned his special black government passport, which assured the holder official status when travelling abroad.
That’s what all passports do. If anything, a special passport for a domestic-based covert-ops office nerd would be a restricted passport, not allowing him to leave USA without special permission. Now that I think about it, unless Schulte had lost his security clearance he would have had to inform the State Dept. of his international travels anyway.
Which would explain how the FBI ‘learned’ of his trip.
Schulte eventually acknowledged that he still had the passport, but maintained that the trip to Mexico was simply a spring-break excursion with his brother. (Roger Schulte told me that the brothers had purchased round-trip tickets for a short visit to Cancún.)
The investigators had a warrant to search Schulte’s apartment, so they all went together to his building, on Thirty-ninth Street.
They did that ambush interview with a search warrant already in their pocket? Then they weren’t actually trying to learn anything.
But that would have been a perfect moment for a wetworks team to upload some kiddie porn.
It was full of computer equipment. When F.B.I. agents obtained a warrant for Schulte’s search history from Google, they discovered that, starting in August, 2016—when he was preparing to leave the C.I.A.—he had conducted thirty-nine searches related to WikiLeaks. In the hours after WikiLeaks posted Vault 7, he searched for “F.B.I.,” and read articles with such titles as “F.B.I. Joins C.I.A. in Hunt for Leaker.” For a guy who was a supposed expert in information warfare, Schulte seemed shockingly sloppy when it came to his own operational security. Even so, the F.B.I. hadn’t found a smoking gun. It had amassed circumstantial evidence tying Schulte to the Vault 7 leak, but it hadn’t found any record of him transmitting data to WikiLeaks—or, indeed, any proof that the secret files had ever been in his possession.
A former CIA cybersecurity guy would naturally have found Wikileaks to be more interesting than most people. Feebs would need something incriminating if they wanted to keep him away from Cancun.
Schulte was not under arrest, so he got a room at a hotel while the search of his apartment continued. The F.B.I. seized his computer hardware, for forensic analysis… they couldn’t access it. But they also had Schulte’s cell phone, and when they checked it they discovered another startling lapse in operational security: he had stored a bunch of passwords on his phone.
Inside was a series of folders. When the investigators opened them, they found an enormous trove of child pornography.
Oh look, they found something incriminating.
On August 24, 2017, at 5:30 a.m., a dozen armed federal agents [arrested him]. At this point, the F.B.I. and federal prosecutors had been investigating Schulte’s possible role in the Vault 7 leak for five months, but they still hadn’t indicted him. Instead, they now charged him with “receipt, possession, and transportation” of child pornography. Schulte pleaded not guilty.
No Cancun for you.
Meanwhile, authorities in Virginia charged him with sexual assault, citing as evidence [a sexually explicit photograph of his female roommate found on his phone]. Schulte was taken into custody once again and locked up at the Metropolitan Correctional Center, in Manhattan.
Hotel Epstein.
He was still there in the summer of 2018, when the government filed a superseding indictment with ten new counts and charged him with leaking Vault 7.
Schulte was on pretrial confinement for roughly an entire year before finally being charged with anything other than what the FBI crime lab might have uploaded onto his devices in order to have an excuse to detain him. Once charged with the data breach, the sex crime charges were dropped.
[Schulte] vowed to go down swinging and “bring this ‘justice’ system crumbling to its knees.”
First, he would need a phone. At the prison, he could make calls on pay phones—but they were monitored and did not offer Internet access. Luckily, black-market smartphones were easy to come by…
Dude, no, you were NOT that stupid.
Schulte figured out a way to hot-wire a light switch in his cell so that it worked as a cell-phone charger. (The person who knew Schulte during this period praised his innovation, saying, “After that, all M.C.C. phones were charged that way.”)
Nothing mentioned in Schulte’s background suggests he could have come up with that on his own. Neither would illicit smartphones have been accessible without the prisoners having some way to charge them prior to Schulte’s arrival.
Astonishingly, it appears that Schulte may have even made contact with WikiLeaks during this period.
I’m “astonished” only that Schulte didn’t see it coming. Guess what happened next? Somebody who logged in as Schulte used that phone to send MORE info, identifying-quality info, to Wikileaks!
In a Twitter post on June 19, 2018, WikiLeaks released seven installments of Schulte’s prison writings, billing them as an account in which the “Alleged CIA #Vault7 whistleblower” would finally speak out in “his own words.” Schulte seems to have envisaged these essays, which combined diaristic accounts of prison life with a broader critique of the criminal-justice system, as a sort of “Letter from a Birmingham Jail.” He titled them “Presumption of Innocence.” Perhaps WikiLeaks simply stumbled on the Facebook page where these essays appeared—or perhaps it was in touch with Schulte. If indeed Schulte managed to contact WikiLeaks from prison, he was adopting a curious strategy: it would be pathologically self-sabotaging to counter allegations that he had shared a set of documents with WikiLeaks by sharing another set of documents with WikiLeaks.
YOU SELF-FUCKING MORON, SCHULTE! YOUR VERY JOB AT THE CIA WAS TO DESIGN THE SOFTWARE TOOLS TO ALLOW EXACTLY THIS KIND OF FALSE FLAGGING, HONEYTRAPPING AND BACKDOOR ACCESS! YOU GOT FRAMED BY THE VERY TOOLS YOU CREATED EXPLICITLY TO FRAME PEOPLE WITH!
GunnerQ shakes head
In one of these jailhouse meditations, Schulte wrote that, in prison, it is prudent not to discuss your case with anyone, because “people are vultures and will do anything to help their own situation”—including barter your information for a better deal.
Or giving you a phone preloaded with CIA smartware.
When this news reached the F.B.I., officials panicked: if Schulte could surreptitiously make calls and access the Internet, there was a danger that he was continuing to leak.
No, the F.B.I. officials laughed their asses off. They had nothing on Schulte; his admin access was revoked long before the leak and he was not the type to think ahead; so they gave Schulte a phone, then logged onto it while he was sleeping and contacted Wikileaks in his name.
“There was a great deal of urgency to find the phone,” one Bureau official later acknowledged. One day in October, 2018, no fewer than fifty agents descended on the Metropolitan Correctional Center, accompanied by a cell-phone-sniffing dog. After they recovered the device, investigators found that it was encrypted—but also that Schulte, true to form, had written the password down in one of his notebooks. He was placed in solitary confinement.
That boldfaced is apparently an experiment in progress, but there’s no reason to not just trace the signal.
[Defense lawyer] Shroff further suggested that the story of Vault 7 was a parable not about the rash decision of one traitor but about the systemic ineptitude of the C.I.A. The agency didn’t even realize that it had been robbed, she pointed out, until WikiLeaks began posting the disclosures. “For God’s sakes,” Shroff said in court. “They went a whole year without knowing that their super-secure system had been hacked.” Then the agency embarked on a witch hunt, she continued, and quickly settled on an “easy target”: Schulte. Within this narrative, the string of prosecution witnesses recounting horror stories about Schulte’s workplace behavior almost seemed to play in Shroff’s favor. Her client was a scapegoat, she insisted—the guy nobody liked.
I concur. Check out what passed for evidence against him:
[On] the sixth day of the trial, prosecutors laid out what they regarded as a coup de grâce—the digital equivalent of fingerprints at a crime scene. Even after Schulte was stripped of his administrative privileges, he had secretly retained the ability to access the O.S.B. network through a back door, by using a special key that he had set up. The password was KingJosh3000. The government contended that on April 20, 2016, Schulte had used his key to enter the system. The files were backed up every day, and while he was logged on Schulte accessed one particular backup—not from that day but from six weeks earlier, on March 3rd. The O.S.B. files released by WikiLeaks were identical to the backup from March 3, 2016. As Denton told the jurors, it was the “exact backup, the exact secrets, put out by WikiLeaks.”
Why would Schulte have skipped the latest six weeks of info, if his goal was to dump info? Somebody NOT Schulte, but trying to frame Schulte by using his login, absolutely they would have gone back six weeks… in order to be consistent with the Wikileaks date.
But why would Schulte? “I’m gonna leak all the information I can. Except for the last six weeks of data.”
On March 9th, [the jury] convicted Schulte of two lesser charges—contempt of court and lying to the F.B.I.—but hung on the eight more serious counts, including those accusing him of transmitting national-security secrets to WikiLeaks. Judge Crotty declared a mistrial.
The article blames the jurors for not understanding the technical complexities of the case and the government overzealously protecting the lives of America’s heroes, but that verdict sounds appropriate. Schulte was never anything but a pre-hated patsy.
Schulte currently resides at the Metropolitan Detention Center, in Brooklyn, where he has been preparing for his new trial [beginning on June 13].
Coinciding with these hatchet-job articles.
Which begs the question once again, how did the CIA not know about those graphic sex crimes and antisemitic vandalism when they gave him top-tier classified admin access? Because none of it is true, Schulte is just a Gamma-class jerkwad that nobody will miss, and somebody needs to hang for the Vault 7 leak.
This is a scary time in the Global American Empire’s fall. The regime is so desperate and divorced from reality that it’s lashing out. Here, the CIA is publicly admitting it gave top-level classified admin access to a known sex offender just to make Schulte look a little more evil at the start of his retrial.
And it’s not even true.
